Abstract

The awarding of the 2010 FIFA World Cup to South Africa was an historic moment for all of Africa as football’s biggest event travelled to the continent for the first time. This study, set five years on, seeks to identify the legacies left by the construction of two new stadiums in Durban and Cape Town. As part of the EU-funded CARNiVAL project, which seeks to investigate the legacies and impacts of hosting such events, interviews were conducted with key stakeholders involved in the planning of legacies in the two cities. Using Chappelet and Junod’s (2006) framework to analyse the legacies, this study found that Durban and Cape Town have used different strategies to leverage the legacies with differing results. Yet, both stadiums have suffered from the same issue; a seeming lack of need for two stadiums with capacities over 54,000, for domestic sport leagues which average fewer than 10,000 spectators.
Introduction

By hosting the FIFA World Cup in 2010, South Africa became the first African country to host a sporting mega-event. One of the more prominently used definitions of a mega-event is that of Roche (2000), who claimed that mega-events are large-scale cultural happenings that have importance on an international scale. These events –which span from commercial to sporting happenings, encompass elements of drama, and are recognised as contributing to popular culture– are typically organised through collaborative schemas that involve national and international as well as governmental and non-governmental organisations. As these mega-events are moving to new and developing countries, research into the legacies that can be gained is becoming increasingly significant, to the extent that major institutions are commissioning research projects with the aim of investigating the value that these legacies can have. One such project is “CARNiVAL”, an EU-funded International Research Staff Exchange Scheme (IRSES) project with partner institutions in the UK, Germany, Brazil, and South Africa. The present study is the first UK-based outcome resulting from this wider project, and offers empirical insights into the two stadiums developed in Cape Town and Durban, five years after the hosting of the World Cup. To this end, this paper uses data collected from key stakeholders in Cape Town and Durban, together with secondary material in order to provide an overview of the current state of the two stadiums, both of which have been labelled as unsustainable, financially-burdening ‘white elephants’ (Maharaj, 2011). Therefore, the primary aim here is to examine the context and current circumstances of the stadiums from a sporting, infrastructural, economic, and social perspective.

The paper is structured as follows: The next section offers a detailed account of the adopted framework around which this study is formed, which is, in turn, supported with some key literatures on the matter of legacy in major sport events. Then, a brief account on the method is given before the description of the current situation in the two stadiums under examination becomes the core of this study. We conclude with some general observations based on the authors’ first-hand experience, while suggesting follow-up actions.

Literature Review

Much of the literature on mega-events has been focused on the ex post impacts on the hosts. One of the more widely used models in the academic literature comes from Chappelet & Junod (2006), who identified urban, infrastructural, economic, social, and sporting legacies as being the most pertinent. Recently, there has
been a move towards other potential legacies, with a developing literature on the political legacies that can be gained from mega-events (Grix, 2012; Haynes, 2001). This section will explore the literature surrounding legacies according to Chappelet and Junod’s (2006) categorisation, before particularly looking at the perceived legacies that can be left by the building of new stadiums in a host country.

The first legacies identified by Chappelet and Junod (2006) are **urban legacies**, which refer to structures that have been constructed for the hosting of a mega-event but are not directly used for sporting purposes. Many hosts of mega-events are able to use their hosting as a catalyst to make investments that would not necessarily be available to them at other times (de Nooij & van den Berg, 2013). Hiller (2006) recognised that there are five specific ways in which host cities are redeveloped when hosting mega-events. Firstly, the major players in the city will seek to work together in order to improve the city, including the redevelopment of any old or unused buildings, and attempt to renovate them into buildings which will enable the development of the service economy. Thus, as the city modernises and focuses more on providing services, a natural change in the leisure activities provided takes place, as new entertainment such as restaurants, bars, theatres, and cultural districts will be developed. As the cities grow and are required to build new facilities (both for sporting and support, such as hotels), it is likely that this will lead to the growth and development of an ‘urban sprawl’, which will see the city become decentralised. And finally, the increased sprawl of the city will lead to increased security, which is especially important for hosts in less-developed nations, where the external expectation could start from a position where it is assumed that security would be an issue (Cornelissen & Maennig, 2010).

Similar to urban legacies are **infrastructural legacies**, which generally apply to the infrastructure that is put in place for the hosting of an event but that are not directly linked to the sporting aspect of the event. These can be difficult to distinguish, with Baumann and Matheson (2013) recognising that the infrastructure put in place would often not be necessary if the event was not being hosted in the first place. The costs for these can be viewed as ‘indirect investment costs’ (Atkinson et al., 2008) and can then contribute to the host ex post for as long as fifty years after the event has taken place (Gratton et al., 2006). Indeed, the potential benefits from investments in a city’s infrastructure for the hosting of a mega-event make it difficult to judge the financial success of hosting such an event. Owen (2005) estimated that investments in infrastructure are nine times higher than the revenue and operating expenses of hosting, and thus will not be repaid during the short period of time in which the event is hosted. It is this long-term benefit that resulted in Preuss’ (2007) argument that politicians should attempt to use the hosting to ‘piggy-back’ needed investment in infrastructure that would not happen otherwise.

As previously mentioned, it can often be difficult to assess the **economic legacies** that can be gained by hosts of mega-events. This type of legacy is often the one
that receives the most focus from academics, with each Olympic Games since Seoul in 1988 having empirical studies examining its economic impact (Bridges, 2012; Brunet, 2009; Brunet & Xinwen, 2008; Hotchkiss et al., 2003; Li et al., 2011). Most hosts of events are hopeful of economic legacies through the multiplier effect; that is, that any spending before, during, and after the event will then ripple through the economy. However, the multiplier applied has often been criticised (Matheson, 2009; Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000), while Porter and Fletcher (2008) demonstrated an exaggeration of the impact of the hosting of the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta. A secondary way for a host to experience economic gains is for the hosting of the event to increase the levels of trade with other nations. Due to the nature of mega-events, which attract fans from all over the world supporting their country’s athletes, increased levels of tourism are expected to be a benefit from hosting such an event. Karadakis et al. (2010) identified tourism as the major growth area for hosts of Olympic events, while Chalip (2002) estimated that 1.6 million additional tourists visited Australia in the years before and after the hosting of the 2000 Olympic Games. Yet, dispute exists as to the real benefits. Three important considerations are often not taken into account when appraising the effects that mega-events have on tourism (Matheson & Baade, 2005). Firstly, it is possible that some of the spending that takes place at an event would have taken place in the economy anyway. Secondly, displacement and crowding-out effects may occur, where consumers who would have otherwise spent money in the local area decide not to do so because the event is taking place. Finally, it is likely that much of the money earned in the local area will be taken out by firms who are likely to be multinationals or who are not based in the area. A final economic benefit that is often expected is an increase in employment figures. Feddersen et al. (1997) believe that nations may bid to host events purely to boost employment; Malfas et al. (2004) and Hotchkiss et al. (2003) both cited the hosting of the Olympic Games as boosting Barcelona and Atlanta’s employment rates in 1992 and 1996, respectively. However, the findings of Hotchkiss et al. (2003) have been disputed by Matheson (2006), while Hagn and Maennig (2009) and du Plessis and Maennig (2007) both questioned findings that Germany’s hosting of the 2006 FIFA World Cup led to a fall in unemployment, in part due the fact that many of the jobs that are created are needed only in the build-up to the event, and thus do not continue ex post (Briedenhann, 2011). Furthermore, it has been argued that hosting such events can lead to a rise in unemployment; Kavestos and Szymanski (2010), for example, argued that the diversion of funds from other areas into hosting could lead to cut-backs elsewhere, resulting in job losses.

Chalip (2006) identified the ‘festival’-like qualities of mega-events as providing an ideal instrument for social impact. Yet, social legacies have been under-researched, with more focus being placed on the more quantifiable economic impacts (Bob & Swart, 2010; Cornelissen et al., 2011). One of the most recognised
social legacies emanating from the hosting of a mega-event is the ‘feel-good’ factor that can galvanise a nation, with citizens feeling “empowered by the successful staging of such monumental events and by succeeding in the eyes of the world” (Black & van der Westhuizen, 2004, p. 1210). However, not all of the social legacies can be viewed as being positive for the host nation. Giulianotti et al. (2014) recognised a number of reasons for citizens to oppose the hosting of a mega-event. Firstly, the prestige of hosting such events can lead to an increase in the living costs for residents, particularly in house pricing. Malfas et al. (2004) studied house price changes around the Sydney 2000 Olympic Games, discovering that in the build-up to the event, house prices rose by seven percent, while rent in the poorest areas rose by 38 percent. The second issue concerns the residents who live near the location of the event, supported by Malfas et al. (2004), who reported that 15,000 residents were evicted from their homes in the build-up to the 1996 Olympic Games in Atlanta.

The final legacies identified by Chappelet and Junod (2006) are sporting legacies, which lead to increased sports participation in the host nation, or leave sporting facilities to be used by the population following the event. Given the nature of sporting mega-events, it would be easy to assume that these legacies would occur naturally. Yet, Haynes (2001) and Veal et al. (2012) both reported that sport participation in Sydney rose in the immediate aftermath of the 2000 Olympic Games, but were not sustained across a longer period of time. Weed et al. (2009) argued that the hosting of these events does not naturally lead to an increase in sporting participation, and that the organising committee should focus on ways to ensure that this legacy does occur. However, much of the research conducted has been focused on Olympic Games, which are multi-sport events. When research has been conducted around single sport events, where the interest is focused on one sport only, there is potentially more evidence of an increase in participation in this sport (Frawley & Cush, 2011).

However, sporting legacies are not just restricted to increasing participation, and also relate to the sporting facilities that are left behind after the conclusion of the event. This is often one of the major investments by hosts in the hosting of events, with Cape Town’s bid for the 2004 Olympic Games planning to build 12 new stadiums and renovate a further 26 venues (Swart & Bob, 2004). The interpretation of the economic impact of sports facilities appears to depend on when and who wrote the report; pre-event economic impact projections focus on the economic impacts, and find benefits for the city hosting the event. Conversely, ex post studies often find that the economic benefits have previously been exaggerated, especially when the opportunity cost for these facilities are taken into account (Siegfried & Zimbalist, 2000; Whitson & Horne, 2006). Proponents of the building of new facilities propose that the long-term economic benefits of a city having a state-of-the-art facility outweigh the short-term costs. South Africa
spent R10 billion on stadiums for the World Cup, and would expect to recoup this over a longer period of time. Income for stadiums is generally gained through a range of direct sources such as rent, sales at the stadium, and advertising, coupled with indirect sources; that is, the multiplier effect that is derived from the growth in economic activity in the area in which the stadium is situated (Baade & Dye, 1990; Swindell & Rosentraub, 1998). These indirect sources of economic benefit include increased employment provided by the stadium (Cornelissen et al., 2011; Swindell & Rosentraub, 1998), although these have been criticised as being positions that are low quality, poorly paid, and often of a seasonal basis and that have little real effect (Baade & Dye, 1990; Coates, 2007). Indeed, the low wages paid by facilities have been shown to have a negative impact on the local area; Baade (1994) showed how new stadiums in Washington, D.C. and Oakland-San Francisco, two areas that have high incomes, actually contributed to a fall in income per-capita. However, ex post analysis of South Africa 2010 identified 66,000 jobs created in the construction of venues and facilities, creating R7.4 billion on wages (approximately €740 million at 2010 rates) to be injected into the local economies (Sport & Recreation South Africa, 2013).

Siegfried and Zimbalist (2000) identified three other criticisms of the economic impact of building new stadiums; namely, the substitution effect, leakages, and the budgetary impact. The substitution effect occurs when spenders at the stadium would have spent money elsewhere. As such, the spending at the stadium is not in addition to the normal levels of spending, but is merely replacing spending that would otherwise be taking place elsewhere in the economy. Indeed, as Coates and Humphreys (2008) argued, most of the spending at facilities would come from consumers’ entertainment budgets. Secondly, leakages occur when the secondary spend leaves the local economy. Even if consumers are spending additional money at the stadium, it is unlikely that this money will stay in the local area. Suppliers to the facility may be based outside of the area, while large proportions of teams’ revenues are spent on salaries for their athletes, who are unlikely to live in the local economic area. Finally, the budgetary impact of building stadiums suggests that the spending by authorities on the stadiums are often larger than the revenues gained, opening a question of the opportunity cost of the funding (Crompton, 1995; Matheson, 2006; Owen, 2005).

However, stadiums do not just contribute directly to the local economy; they can also play a part in the marketing and profile of a city. Firstly, as Crompton (2004) recognised, a city with a world-renowned sports team playing in its stadium will automatically receive worldwide attention. Yet, the potential for increased image can go further than this; there is a move towards using stadiums as a way of improving the image of a city, and indeed basing the tourism strategy of an economy around sports facilities (Barghchi et al., 2009; Maennig & du Plessis, 2009; Smith, 2010). This is only likely to work if there is a concerted effort between the stadium and
economic area to align strategies (Stevens & Wootton, 2014), and is more pertinent in the building of stadiums outside of mega-events. In Europe, where many private teams own their own stadium, there should still be responsibility borne by local authorities, and the bearing of costs, as if this is left to the teams themselves, they will maximise their own utility (Allmers & Maennig, 2009; du Plessis & Maennig, 2007). Yet, the US – where much of the literature on stadiums focused its research – has further issues, as cities often build and renovate facilities in order to either keep existing teams or lure new teams to their area (Baade & Dye, 1990; Coates, 2007; Coates & Humphreys, 2008; Matheson & Baade, 2006). As such, there is less conflict regarding the ownership and responsibility of the stadiums, but this does raise questions as to which stakeholders are paying for the facility, and which stakeholders are expected to benefit from its usage.

As part of the R16 billion (approximately €1.6 billion) spent on ‘stadiums and precinct development’ (Maharaj, 2011), two new stadiums where built in Cape Town and Durban: the Cape Town Stadium and the Moses Mabhida Stadium, respectively. This significant investment was made in the belief that South Africa would gain significant long-term legacies, from tangible improvements in transport and infrastructure to increased confidence and an improved global opinion of the country (Sport & Recreation South Africa, 2013). The remainder of this paper will seek to explore how successfully these legacies are being leveraged.

**Method**

**Research Context**

Five years on from the historic 19th FIFA World Cup in South Africa in 2010, the present study draws on the two largest-capacity stadiums built purposefully to help stage the mega event: the Cape Town Stadium and the Moses Mabhida Stadium in Durban. This follows a visit to the two stadiums by the first two authors in July of 2014.

As mentioned, this study is part of a wider, EU-funded transcontinental project – entitled ‘CARNiVAL’ – examining why mega events fail to deliver sustainable legacies. The project also seeks to identify best practices which enable potential impacts to be realised in light of hosting such events, with the aim of enhancing knowledge and understanding, encouraging stakeholders to adopt sustainable and responsible mega-event management guidelines, and to help ensure the maximum return on investment for hosts in bidding and hosting mega-events.
Data Collection

The study employs a case study approach, qualitative in nature, in order to offer insights into how key stakeholders in the context of the planning of events and the creation of the stadiums perceive the issue of legacy with regard to the 2010 World Cup.

The first two authors carried out three in-depth interviews: firstly, a one-hour interview was conducted in Cape Town with the management of the Western Cape Government; the second meeting lasted two hours and took place with representatives of the Department of Sport & Recreation South Africa; finally, a two-hour interview took place with representatives from Tourism KwaZulu-Natal, the organisation responsible for tourism in the KwaZulu-Natal area, in which Durban resides. In addition to these interviews, the authors visited the two stadiums and took part in their official guided tours, where additional data was gathered.

Moreover, analysis of secondary documentation has also been part of the data collection process. Official documents – such as the 2010 FIFA World Cup Country Report, produced by Sport & Recreation South Africa (2013), as well as sources from the mainstream media, such as the stadiums’ official websites, contemporary newspaper articles, and websites dedicated to providing information regarding the 2010 World Cup – all offered invaluable insights regarding the legacy of these particular sporting facilities. In essence, through this process we sought to ascertain the events and occurrences that have taken place at the stadiums since 2010, and understand to what extent these happenings fulfil the pre-determined legacy objectives.

Findings & Discussion

Sporting

Both the Durban and the Cape Town stadiums were newly built for the 2010 World Cup at a significant investment. It is undeniable that both stadiums are impressive sights; as could be expected of a modern, FIFA-accredited venue, the bowl, ‘polo-mint’-shaped design of the Cape Town Stadium is both sleek and dynamic, with an impressive view of the pitch from any seat. Set on the Atlantic coast with the iconic Table Mountain as a backdrop, the stadium surely enjoys one of the most breath-taking surroundings in world sport. However, this alone does not bring spectators. Ajax Cape Town FC currently leases the 55,000-seat capacity stadium for its home matches, but the club is averaging just 6258 spectators for home attendances during the 2014/15 season to-date, and even this figure is
inflated by a crowd of 44,000 for one fixture against Kaiser Chiefs (ESPN, 2015a). According to a Western Cape government official, “Ajax Cape Town FC currently plays all of their matches at the stadium. It doesn’t make sense – who wants to see a thousand people in the stadium on TV? They should just play their bigger matches against Kaiser Chiefs and Orlando Pirates there” (Director, Western Cape Government). The stadium’s official website shows upcoming concerts for Michael Bublé and One Direction (but no other non-sporting events for the remainder of 2015), indicating the stadium’s lack of mechanisms for revenue (Cape Town Stadium, 2015).

Named in honour of the former leader of the South African Communist Party, the Moses Mabhida Stadium in Durban is perhaps even more eye-catching than its counterpart in Cape Town. Moses Mabhida has hosted the Top Gear Live car show, and a T20 cricket match between South Africa and India in 2011, generating a record crowd for a cricket match held in Africa (ESPN Cricinfo, 2011). With its famous arch, inspired by the South African flag, the stadium lays claim to the world’s tallest ‘arch’ swing (Guinness World Records, 2011), which allows partakers to ride the swing on an arc into the centre of the stadium. With a similar seating capacity to Cape Town Stadium (54,000), Moses Mabhida Stadium features multi-coloured seats designed to give the impression that the ground is full even when empty. Presently, Moses Mabhida stadium also plays host to around half of the fixtures of the AmaZulu Football Club, with the club’s remaining fixtures played at the much smaller-scale Princess Magogo stadium. The club’s average 2014/15 season attendance of 6100 is very similar to that of Ajax Cape Town, and even the largest attendance of 20,000 for the Kaiser Chiefs fixture (ESPN, 2015b) would have filled only around one-third of Moses Mabhida Stadium. Similarly to Cape Town Stadium, there is only one major non-sporting event scheduled to take place in 2015, a concert by the American artist Chris Brown, in April (MMStadium, 2015).

It is remarkable just how close Moses Mabhida is situated to the Kings Park Stadium, a 52,000-capacity ground that is home to the Sharks rugby union team, with the two stadiums being situated adjacent to one another. Our tour guide talked about the Kings Park stadium in some detail, mentioning the fact that it is in need of a major upgrade. As Moses Mabhida Stadium was built to meet the strict requirements of FIFA, the pitch is not of the required size to host professional rugby matches. Kings Park was initially proposed as Durban’s stadium for the World Cup, but a political decision was taken to create a ‘sports precinct’. While this decision potentially has tourism benefits, with a number of cities using facilities to become a ‘sport city’ (see Smith, 2010), it has resulted in there being two large stadiums, neither of which can be filled with spectators on a regular basis for domestic sport.
Economic

Nearly R8 billion was spent on the two stadiums (R4.5 billion on Cape Town Stadium and R3.4 billion on Moses Mabhida Stadium) (Maharaj, 2011), a significant investment for a nation which in 2011 had over 25 percent of its population earning below $2 a day (The World Bank, 2013). As such, the opportunity cost for this funding has been criticised, with Briedenhann (2011 p.21) finding that 64 percent of respondents believed that “the money spent on the construction of the World Cup stadiums would have been better spent on housing, health and education facilities for deprived communities.” However, while this has been a criticism of the 2010 FIFA World Cup, residents in South Africa appear to have mixed views: Bassa and Jaggernath (2010) found that 66 percent of respondents in Durban believed that the Moses Mabhida stadium could be viewed as a positive outcome, whilst Swart and Bob (2012) found that over 85 percent of respondents in Cape Town believed that the World Cup would generate employment opportunities. Moreover, a similar number agreed or strongly agreed that “the event will be a major boost for economic development in the areas where stadiums are located” (ibid., pp. 112-113).

Yet, while Cape Town has the backdrop of Table Mountain, it was striking to feel not only the emptiness of the location, but also how unused and pristine it still felt. Immaculate polished floors, spotless walkways, and fully prepared conference rooms could all be viewed, but there seemed to be very few people around, aside from the stadium tour guide and a small number of tourists. Perhaps the most poignant sight of all was inside the stadium itself, being confronted by a mass of grey seats covered with plastic. According to the tour guide, “these haven’t been needed for a while”, highlighting the lack of attendees at the stadium since the World Cup. As such, it is not surprising to hear that the stadium is losing around R4.4 million annually (approximately €440,000) in maintenance costs alone (Maharaj, 2011). At R45 for an adult tour (around €4.50), it is difficult to envisage this activity adding much revenue to the bottom line. Just as strikingly, Cape Town offers tourists the opportunity to visit the townships around the city, where corrugated iron is in stark contrast to the state-of-the-art stadium situated just a few miles away. Comparatively, the Moses Mabhida stadium in Durban appeared to be far better integrated into the city, due in part to other income-generating facilities in operation, such as a café, gift shop, sky ride, and the aforementioned arch swing.

Both the stadiums in Cape Town and Durban contribute to the tourism efforts of their respective cities, adding to a number of cities that have hosted mega-events and that have used this fact to signal a ‘world-class city’ status (Coates, 2007). Indeed, interviews with management at Tourism KwaZulu-Natal revealed the importance of the World Cup for a city such as Durban, with articles in international newspapers such as the Washington Post being published with an opening line
of “Oh Durban, where have you been my whole World Cup?” (Goff, 2010). The hosting of World Cup matches helped to “turn around the image” of the city, while investment into infrastructure contributed to an uplift of the image of the city (KwaZulu-Natal Conventions Bureau, personal communication). The building of new stadiums can trigger urban redevelopment within a city and boost tourism, and Durban’s Moses Mabhida, with its iconic arch, is no exception. Allmers and Maennig (2009) recognised how the Moses Mabhida stadium was being designed as an ‘iconic building’, with a design that is aimed to embed it into the local area. Indeed, it is noticeable that the Moses Mabhida stadium features prominently on the Durban Tourism Website, whereas the Cape Town stadium appears far less prominently (Durban Tourism, 2015; Cape Town Tourism, 2015).

Social

While the previous section has covered the ways in which Durban and Cape Town have used the hosting of World Cup matches to affect the world’s views on the two cities in question, social legacies concentrate on the local residents. These often go hand in hand with economic legacies: if an area is boosted from an economic standpoint, this will have an impact on the area from a social standpoint. Sport & Recreation South Africa (2013) claimed that 91 percent of South Africans believe that hosting the event united the nation. This is likely to have been a key objective following on from previously hosting the 1995 Rugby World Cup and 1996 African Cup of Nations, and using the national team’s success as a tool for nation unity. While it is probable that publications by Sport & Recreation South Africa are likely to report the tournament in a positive light, they do appear to corroborate findings by Bassa and Jaggernauth (2010), who found that 64 percent of residents living close to Moses Mabhida believed that their standard of living would improve. Furthermore, while it has been previously reported that the building of stadiums can be disruptive for local residents (Jones, 2001), Bassa and Jaggernauth (2010) found that 55 percent of interviewees were not disrupted, while the others listed noise, overcrowding, and traffic congestion as negative externalities from the construction of stadiums.

Yet, the social impacts of Cape Town’s stadium, situated in Green Point, have been one of the more contentious issues of the World Cup. South Africa initially proposed the Newlands rugby ground (51,900 capacity) as Cape Town’s choice of venue – a stadium that FIFA reported would be “easily suitable” (FIFA Inspection Report in Alegi, 2007, p. 318). However, the local government believed that championing Athlone Stadium (34,000 capacity) in the under-resourced Cape Flats would address the woefully inadequate provision of sporting facilities
in black communities and football’s dependency on rugby grounds. The City of Cape Town believed that using Athlone adhered to FIFA’s social responsibility objectives, as it would help the most disadvantaged communities; however, FIFA were reluctant for its showcase event to have a backdrop of low-cost housing and poverty. Instead, FIFA proposed Green Point, within walking distance of the V&A Waterfront, one of Cape Town’s prime tourist locations. The South African Local Organising Committee endorsed this view, with Green Point going on to host eight World Cup matches, including Netherland’s semi-final victory over Uruguay (Alegi, 2007). The decision to use Green Point as opposed to Athlone limited the social legacy that Cape Town could receive, given that instead of one of the poorest areas of the city gaining an injection of ‘development’, the stadium was instead located near the picturesque V&A Waterfront, an area already visited by tourists. Furthermore, the change in venues disrupted the legacy for local residents, with Swart and Bob (2012) finding that local residents in both areas were not entirely sure of where the legacy stadium would be. Yet findings by Bob and Swart (2009) and Bob and Majola (2011) revealed that communities both in Cape Town and Durban were generally positive to the notion of staging a World Cup.

**Infrastructural**

South Africa upgraded its transport network, including the new Gautrain rail system (Allmers & Maennig, 2009), for its hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup; however, it claimed that this was an investment that would have been made irrespective of whether or not it had won the bid (Bob & Swart, 2010). As Cape Town Stadium was built upon an existing sport site, and is within walking distance of one of Cape Town’s primary tourist hubs, there was little need for increased infrastructure. The Cape Town stadium does not have a dedicated station, with public transport consisting of buses and park-and-ride facilities. This was highlighted as an issue during our interviews with the Western Cape Government; the MyCiTi bus route has become the ‘foundation’ for Cape Town during the World Cup. There were broader plans for more advanced transport systems, but during the World Cup itself, this was based purely around the stadium. Since then, however, MyCiti has subsequently been further expanded around the city (Western Cape Government, personal communication). Conversely, in Durban,
a new R140 million (approximately €14 million at 2010 prices) train station was opened in 2010 prior to the World Cup, designed to serve spectators visiting the stadium. This station is currently in operation, and is used not only for the events that are held at Moses Mabhida, but also to better integrate the stadium with the rest of the city. While this station was designed solely to accommodate spectators at Moses Mabhida, it is also worth noting that Durban built a new airport in the build-up to the event, with King Shaka International Airport opening in April 2010.

Conclusion

It has been stated by many scholars that it is unlikely that mega events will result in the widespread anticipated economic and social benefits, particularly considering that these events are essentially controlled by outside forces – FIFA, in this case (Bassa & Jaggernath, 2010). Cape Town and Durban have taken different routes in their attempt to leverage the billions spent on new stadiums. Whereas Cape Town Stadium is situated near a popular tourist destination and Table Mountain as backdrop, it is Durban, out of the two, which has better utilised the stadium. Whereas Cape Town Stadium appears to be isolated in its location, Moses Mabhida Stadium was buzzing with tourists, who were using the café and shops at the stadium as well as visiting the famous arch. However, both stadiums are struggling to attract fans to regular sporting events, averaging an attendance of around 6000 in stadiums with capacities that are ten times larger. Without an increase in attendances, it is unlikely that the stadiums will ever become self-funding or will indeed contribute to the rebranding of the cities.

The present papers’ findings do highlight the issues with FIFA taking World Cups to developing nations that currently cannot sustain the levels of attendances that are seen during the event itself. FIFA presently requires hosts to provide one stadium for the opening ceremony and final match with a capacity of 80,000, two stadiums for semi-finals with capacities of 60,000, and the remaining matches to played in stadiums with capacities of at least 40,000. With FIFA also requiring matches to be hosted across the country in order to boost the reach of the events, this potentially results in a number of ‘white elephants’ being spread across the hosting country. As such, if FIFA’s policy of taking events to developing nations is to continue, there perhaps needs to be more thought regarding the nature of the facilities that are used. South Africa already had a number of stadiums that were of the required capacity, including Kings Park Stadium and Newlands Rugby Ground, in Durban and Cape Town, respectively. Perhaps, it would have been more efficient for South Africa to redevelop these stadiums, rather than building new ones in the same city.
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